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I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the most closely watched court battles of the 2012 presidential 
election was the lawsuit that the Obama campaign brought against the Ohio 
secretary of state in an attempt to restore early in-person voting for all Ohio 
voters on the final three days before Election Day. The case—Obama for 
America v. Husted1—revolved around the simple fact that in the 2012 election, 
new Ohio laws permitted county boards of elections to offer early in-person 
voting only to military voters on these final three days, but halted early voting 
for all other voters at 6:00 p.m. on the Friday before Election Day. Because in 
the 2008 presidential election some 100,000 non-military Ohio voters had voted 
during the same final three days of early voting, and because the Obama 
campaign and its co-plaintiffs, the Democratic National Committee and the 
Ohio Democratic Party, saw these voters as tending to vote Democratic, the 
lawsuit was seen as potentially critical to the outcome of a close Ohio race. 
The equal protection claim at the core of the Obama for America suit was 
initially greeted with skepticism by many knowledgeable observers, who 
presumed that the state was free to provide these additional early voting hours, 
like many other accommodations, exclusively to military voters.2 These 
prognosticators were surprised when the federal district court issued a 
preliminary injunction, later affirmed by the Sixth Circuit, requiring Ohio to 
offer all other voters the same early voting opportunities that it provided to 
                                                                                                                       
 * Professor of Law and Senior Fellow of Election Law @ Moritz, The Ohio State 
University Michael E. Moritz College of Law. I am grateful for the advice and 
encouragement of my Election Law @ Moritz colleagues Terri Enns and Ned Foley. 
 1 697 F.3d 423, 423 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 2 See, e.g., Edward B. Foley, Analyzing a “Voting Wars” Trifecta, Free & Fair Blog, 
ELECTION LAW @ MORITZ (Aug. 16, 2012), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/ 
freefair/index.php?ID=9579 (predicting the argument would fail); Richard L. Hasen, Is the 
Supreme Court About to Swing Another Presidential Election?, SLATE (Oct. 15, 2012, 3:52 
PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2012/10/if_the_supreme_ 
court_cuts_early_voting_in_ohio_it_could_swing_the_state.html (calling the plaintiffs’ 
claim “a major stretch”). 
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military voters.3 The secretary of state then set uniform hours allowing all Ohio 
voters the opportunity of early in-person voting on the final Saturday, Sunday, 
and Monday,4 and the rest is history. 
But what about the long-term legal impact of the case? A number of 
military organizations took an active interest in the proceedings, mostly in 
opposition to the plaintiffs, whether as intervenors, amici curiae, or 
commentators. The core of their interest was a concern that the case was a threat 
to all assistance for military voters. For instance, in their brief to the Sixth 
Circuit, the Intervenors wrote that the suit could mean that “state and local 
governments soon will stop offering such assistance, and the fundamental right 
to vote of the members of our Armed Forces will be undermined.”5 
Fortunately, this is a highly unlikely result. Indeed, as discussed below, the 
case provides very little reason to worry about the constitutionality of other 
military voting accommodations, notwithstanding the Intervenors’ strong 
opposition to the outcome in this case. Part II first provides the necessary 
underpinnings of the issues raised in the litigation. Parts III and IV then turn to 
an analysis of the judicial decisions, and to the impact on military voting 
generally of the way in which the federal courts resolved the case. 
II. THE STATUTORY LANDSCAPE 
Military voters benefit from a variety of federal and state assistance to help 
them overcome their unique voting challenges. Since 1986, the Uniformed and 
Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) has guaranteed overseas 
voters and active duty military who are absent from their voting residence a 
right to participate in federal elections conducted in their home state, and also 
has required states to follow certain processes to facilitate the exercise of that 
right.6 To improve these processes, in 2009 Congress passed the Military and 
Overseas Voter Empowerment (MOVE) Act7 as an amendment to the 
UOCAVA. Among other provisions, the MOVE Act requires that states 
transmit absentee ballots no later than forty-five days before Election Day to 
qualified UOCAVA voters who have applied for them, and that they transmit 
the ballots electronically to voters who request this mode of transmission.8  
                                                                                                                       
 3 Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 425. 
 4 See Directive No. 2012-50 from John Husted, Ohio Sec’y of State, to All Cnty. Bds. 
of Election (Oct. 16, 2012), available at http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/Upload/elections/ 
directives/2012/Dir2012-50.pdf.  
 5 Brief of Intervenor Defendants-Appellants Military Groups at 3, Obama for Am. v. 
Husted, 697 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2012) (No. 12-4076), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/ 
electionlaw/litigation/documents/BriefofIntervenorMilitaryGroups.pdf. 
 6 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973ff to 1973ff-7 (Supp. IV 2011).  
 7 Military and Overseas Voter Empowerment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-84, §§ 575–89, 123 
Stat. 2318–35 (2009). 
 8 Id. at §§ 578(f)(1), 579(a)(8)(A). 
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In 2010, the Uniform Law Commission (formally titled the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws) completed a two-year 
drafting process that led to its promulgation of a new uniform state law, 
recommended for enactment in all fifty states. This law, called the Uniform 
Military and Overseas Voters Act (UMOVA),9 not only offered a template for 
states to use in complying with the MOVE Act, but also extended coverage to a 
broader category of overseas voters, as well as to active duty military whether 
or not they are absent from their voting residence. In many other ways as well, 
UMOVA continued to improve the voting opportunities available to military 
and overseas voters.10  
From 2005 through 2010, Ohio law allowed early in-person voting to begin 
thirty-five days before Election Day, and to continue through the Monday 
immediately prior to Election Day, if county boards of elections desired.11 In 
June 2011, as part of a package of election law reforms in House Bill (H.B.) 
194, the Ohio General Assembly reduced the period of early in-person voting. 
The measure was bitterly opposed by many Democrats, but supporters of the 
measure argued that five weeks of early voting were excessive, and that having 
to conduct early voting on the last three days before Election Day unduly 
interfered with local election officials’ final preparations. Accordingly, H.B. 
194 amended state law to begin the period of early in-person voting three weeks 
before Election Day, and to end it on the Friday before Election Day. 
Specifically, H.B. 194 set 6:00 p.m. that Friday as the endpoint for all voters, 
and did so by amending two separate statutory sections, one (Ohio Revised 
Code (O.R.C.) § 3509.01) applicable to regular voters, and another (O.R.C. 
§ 3511.10) applicable to military and overseas voters.12 
The saga of Ohio’s 2012 early in-person voting hours was just beginning, 
however. The legislature had overlooked two other existing statutory 
provisions—one (O.R.C. § 3509.03) applicable to regular voters, and the other 
(O.R.C. § 3511.02) applicable to military and overseas voters—that each 
specified that early in-person voting continued until the close of business the 
                                                                                                                       
 9 See UNIFORM MILITARY AND OVERSEAS VOTERS ACT (2010), available at 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/military%20and%20overseas%20voters/umova_fi
nal_10.pdf. 
 10 I served as the Reporter to the Uniform Law Commission drafting committee that 
prepared UMOVA, and my work in that role informs my understanding of the obstacles 
facing military and overseas voters, and of the impact of the set of federal and state 
accommodations created for these voters. 
 11 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3509.01(B)(2), 3509.03(I) (West Supp. 2012). In the 
2008 presidential election, many voters took advantage of the first five days of early voting 
as an opportunity to register and vote simultaneously, because Ohio law permits voters to 
register until thirty days before an election. Meanwhile, close to 105,000 voters took 
advantage of the final three days of early voting that year. See Obama for Am. v. Husted, 
697 F.3d 423, 426 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 12 See Amended Substitute H.B. 194, 129th Gen. Assemb., sec. 1, §§ 3509.01, 3511.10 
(Ohio 2011), available at http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/BillText129/129_HB_194_EN_ 
N.html. 
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Monday before Election Day.13 To remedy the inconsistency between these 
provisions and H.B. 194, the legislature quickly passed a separate “technical 
corrections” measure to amend these provisions, changing their specification of 
the end of early voting to the previous Friday at 6:00 p.m., instead of close-of-
business Monday. These corrections were passed as part of H.B. 224, a 
bipartisan bill that passed unanimously as an emergency law, whose main 
provisions provided other accommodations for military and overseas voters.14 
As an “emergency law,” H.B. 224 was not subject to the possibility of a public 
referendum.  
At this point, the law was clear: no voters, military or non-military, could 
vote early in-person after 6:00 p.m. on the Friday before Election Day. But the 
law continued to evolve. Before any of the provisions of H.B. 194 had taken 
effect, opponents quickly collected enough signatures to delay its 
implementation until Ohio voters could approve or disapprove it by referendum 
at the next general election, slated for November 2012.15 The referendum 
pertained only to H.B. 194, and therefore delayed only its provisions, but not 
the “technical corrections” of H.B. 224, which had been intended to harmonize 
all the early voting sections of the Ohio code.16  
The result was an unintended mess. With respect to military and overseas 
voters, one pre-existing provision, which H.B. 194 would have changed but 
which now remained in effect, allowed early in-person voting through Election 
Day.17 But the technical correction of H.B. 224 called for early in-person voting 
to end at 6:00 p.m. on the Friday before, a clear statutory conflict.18 As for all 
other voters, the other technical correction of H.B. 224 also called for early in-
person voting to end at 6:00 p.m. Friday.19 Meanwhile, the pre-existing 
provision that H.B. 194 also would have amended to add the same 6:00 p.m. 
Friday deadline did not say anything about the endpoint of early in-person 
voting for all other voters, and instead provided only that early voting would 
                                                                                                                       
 13 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3509.03, 3511.02 (West Supp. 2012). 
 14 See Amended Substitute H.B. 224, 129th Gen. Assemb., sec. 1, §§ 3509.03, 3511.02 
(Ohio 2011), available at http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/BillText129/129_HB_ 
224_EN_N.html. 
 15 See Joe Hallett, HB 194 Foes Turn in Signatures, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Sept. 30, 
2011, http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2011/09/30/hb-194-foes-turn-in-
signatures.html#comment; Secretary of State Husted Certifies HB 194 Referendum Petition 
Signatures, OHIO SECRETARY OF STATE (Dec. 9, 2011), http://www.sos.state.oh.us/ 
mediaCenter/2011/2011-12-09.aspx.  
 16 Secretary of State Husted Certifies HB 194 Referendum Petition Signatures, OHIO 
SECRETARY OF STATE (Dec. 9, 2011), http://www.sos.state.oh.us/mediaCenter/2011/2011-
12-09.aspx. 
 17 See Amended Substitute H.B. 194, 129th Gen. Assemb., sec. 1, § 3511.10 (Ohio 
2011), available at http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/BillText129/129_HB_194_EN_ 
N.html. 
 18 See supra note 14, at sec. 1, § 3511.02. 
 19 See supra note 14, at sec. 1, § 3509.03.  
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begin thirty-five days before Election Day.20 Thus, no statutory conflict existed 
concerning the extent of early in-person voting opportunities for regular voters. 
But the provisions for regular voters no longer matched those for military 
voters, despite the legislature’s efforts to treat military and non-military voters 
alike for purposes of early in-person voting. 
In October 2011, Ohio Secretary of State John Husted prepared an Advisory 
to resolve the clear statutory conflict over the early voting deadline for military 
voters.21 In preparing this Advisory, the secretary of state could have looked to 
the General Provisions of the Ohio Revised Code for some guidance: O.R.C. 
§ 1.52 provides that where two statutory provisions conflict, the provision 
“latest in date . . . prevails,” a reformulation of the familiar canon of 
interpretation that a more recently enacted statute controls an earlier enacted 
statute.22 Here, the latest enactment was H.B. 224, which provided the new 
deadline of Friday at 6:00 p.m. Imposing this deadline for military voters also 
would have been consistent with the legislature’s efforts to establish identical 
early voting opportunities for all voters. 
However, the secretary of state’s Advisory instead picked the older 
deadline, erring on the side of accommodating military voters as expansively as 
possible.23 The Advisory ordered Ohio county boards of elections to continue to 
follow the pre-2011 law that permitted early in-person voting by military voters 
through Election Day,24 notwithstanding the new Friday deadline of the 
technical correction in H.B. 224. This Advisory set the essential legal landscape 
on which the Obama campaign built its July 2012 equal protection claim.25 
                                                                                                                       
 20 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3509.01 (West Supp. 2012). 
 21 Advisory No. 2011-07 from John Husted, Ohio Sec’y of State, to All Cnty Bds. of 
Election 2 (Oct. 14, 2011), available at http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/Upload/elections/ 
advisories/2011/Adv2011-07.pdf. 
 22 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1.52 (West Supp. 2012).  
 23 Husted, supra note 21, at 2. 
 24 Id. However, until the enactment of other provisions in H.B. 224, Ohio law matched 
federal law (UOCAVA) in requiring a military voter to be “absent” because of military duty 
in order to take advantage of Ohio’s accommodations for military voters. An absent military 
voter would not generally be able to take advantage of early in-person voting. H.B. 224 
changed this to follow UMOVA in permitting any active duty military, whether absent or 
not, to use Ohio’s military voter accommodations. See Amended Substitute H.B. 224, 129th 
Gen. Assemb., sec. 1, §§ 3509.10, 3511.01(C) (Ohio 2012), available at http:// 
www.legislature.state.oh.us/BillText129/129_HB_224_EN_N.html; infra text accompanying 
notes 57–59. 
 25 In May 2012, the Ohio General Assembly repealed H.B. 194 in its entirety, thereby 
nullifying the upcoming referendum concerning H.B. 194. In their brief, the intervenors used 
this legislative action to argue that now the statute “latest in date” was this repealer, which 
reestablished for military voters the deadline existing before H.B. 194 was enacted. See Brief 
of Intervenor Defendants-Appellants Military Groups at 15–16, Obama for Am. v. Husted, 
697 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2012) (No. 12-4076), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/ 
electionlaw/litigation/documents/BriefofIntervenorMilitaryGroups.pdf. This argument elided 
the facts that the operative Directive was issued long before this repeal, that, at the time of 
this repeal, the pre-existing deadline was already the operative deadline because H.B. 194 
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III. THE FEDERAL COURTS GRANT RELIEF 
As Part II has summarized, both the nature of Ohio’s additional early in-
person voting opportunities for UOCAVA voters, and the way in which these 
voters received this favorable treatment, were somewhat peculiar. This peculiar 
background had a substantial influence on the federal courts’ disposition of the 
Obama campaign’s lawsuit. In granting a preliminary injunction to restore early 
in-person voting for all Ohio voters, both the district court and the Sixth Circuit 
were heavily influenced by their conclusion that Ohio’s reduced early voting 
period placed a new burden on non-military voters, and by their conclusion that 
the state lacked a sufficiently weighty interest to justify this differential 
treatment. 
On August 31, 2012, the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Ohio issued an opinion and order enjoining Ohio from enforcing the 
provisions of H.B. 224, as construed by the secretary of state, that halted early 
in-person voting at 6:00 p.m. on the Friday before Election Day for all but 
military voters.26 The district court began its opinion with this characterization: 
“In 2005, Ohio expanded participation in absentee balloting and in-person early 
voting to include all registered Ohio voters. Now, ‘in-person early voting’ has 
been redefined by the Ohio legislature to limit Plaintiffs’ access to the polls.”27 
This perspective shaped the district court’s view that for purposes of this equal 
protection claim, Ohio needed more than the traditional rational basis to justify 
discriminating among different categories of voters. Instead, the court employed 
the legal standard developed in the Anderson v. Celebrezze28 and Burdick v. 
Takushi29 cases for when the right to vote is burdened, under which the 
distinction “must be justified by . . . state interests sufficiently weighty to justify 
the limitation.”30 Upon review, the Sixth Circuit embraced the same legal 
standard.31  
On the facts before it, which included four uncontested studies presented by 
the plaintiffs, the district court concluded that eliminating early in-person voting 
on the final three days for all but military voters would burden many thousands 
                                                                                                                       
had never taken effect, and that a metaphysical issue therefore existed of whether there even 
was anything to repeal during the period after the referendum petition for H.B. 194 was 
qualified but before the public had resolved, by the referendum, the issue of whether H.B. 
194 should become law. Meanwhile, the plaintiffs attempted to suggest that it was this 
repeal, motivated primarily by a political desire to take the wind out the sails of the 
referendum, that gave rise to the statutory conflict, when in fact the statutory conflict arose 
as soon as the referendum process nullified the effective date of H.B. 194. 
 26 Obama for Am. v. Husted, No. 2:12-CV-0636, 2012 WL 3765060, at *11 (S.D. Ohio 
Aug. 31, 2012), aff’d, 697 F.3d 423, 437 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 27 Obama for Am., 2012 WL 3765060, at *1. 
 28 460 U.S. 780, 788–89 (1983). 
 29 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992). 
 30 Obama for Am., 2012 WL 3765060, at *6 (quoting Crawford v. Marion Cnty. 
Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 191 (2008)). 
 31 Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 431. 
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of Ohio voters, including minority and working-class voters who in 2008 had 
been the heaviest users of the final weekend of early voting.32 The Sixth Circuit 
not only embraced this conclusion, but also added that the district court record 
included evidence that “a significant number of Ohio voters will in fact be 
precluded from voting without the additional three days.”33 It clarified that it 
did not mean that these voters would be legally precluded or prohibited from 
voting, but only that they would in fact otherwise fail to find “alternate means 
of access to the ballot.”34  
The district court then considered whether Ohio’s two proffered reasons for 
the differential treatment were sufficiently weighty. One reason was the desire 
to protect election boards and allow them to focus all their attention on Election 
Day preparation during the final three days, instead of also having to conduct 
early in-person voting. The court found “insufficient evidence” that election 
boards could not simultaneously do both, noting that it had before it conflicting 
representations on this point from state and county election officials.35 In 
affirming the district court, the Sixth Circuit also noted that for six years Ohio 
election officials had successfully conducted elections with early in-person 
voting on the final three days.36 
Ohio’s second reason was that military voters are often subject to sudden 
deployment on a moment’s notice. The defendants argued to the court that 
without the option of early in-person voting on the final three days, some of 
these military voters would be unable to vote. But the court observed that the 
Ohio statutory framework did not in fact ensure that these very military voters 
would be able to vote, because each county retained the discretion to decide 
whether or not to open its election offices for military voters on the final 
weekend. Moreover, the record before the court suggested that most Ohio 
county election offices actually would not be open. Thus, although the court had 
agreed that this proffered justification “[a]t first glance . . . appears to weigh 
heavily in favor of Defendants,”37 in the end the court found the interest 
“not . . . strong” because the state itself had not even secured this interest except 
                                                                                                                       
 32 Obama for Am., 2012 WL 3765060, at *3–4, *7. 
 33 Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 431.  
 34 Id. (quoting Citizens for Legislative Choice v. Miller, 144 F.3d 916, 921 (6th Cir. 
1998)). Judge White, concurring with the majority in affirming the district court, rejected the 
majority’s conclusion that the elimination of the last three days of early voting would 
preclude “a significant number of Ohio voters” from voting. Id. at 440. Nonetheless, she 
concluded that the resulting burden on some voters was substantial, and could not be 
divorced from what she described as “eleventh-hour changes” to voting rules in place since 
2005, intended to remedy the burden of long lines at the polls. Id. at 442. Further concluding 
that the defendants’ asserted concern about abrupt military deployments “had no relation to 
the statutory distinction” between military and non-military voters, Judge White also found 
the Anderson–Burdick balancing to favor the plaintiffs. Id. at 443.  
 35 Obama for Am., 2012 WL 3765060, at *8. 
 36 Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 433. 
 37 Obama for Am., 2012 WL 3765060, at *8. 
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on the final Monday.38 The Sixth Circuit similarly called the state’s proffered 
interest “a worthy and commendable goal,” but found “no corresponding 
satisfactory reason to prevent non-military voters from casting their ballots as 
well.”39 
By its terms, the district court’s preliminary injunction appeared to require 
that Ohio make early in-person voting available to all voters on the last three 
days before Election Day.40 This would be sweeping relief, given that the 
district court’s own analysis depended in substantial part on the fact that county 
boards of election could decide for themselves whether to even provide military 
voters with this opportunity, and most Ohio counties apparently were not likely 
to do so. The district court’s decision in this regard appeared to rely on the 
secretary of state’s avowed desire, expressed in another context, to make early 
voting hours uniform throughout the state.41 However, in affirming the district 
court’s conclusion that Ohio had violated the Equal Protection Clause, the Sixth 
Circuit construed the preliminary injunction to require only that Ohio return to 
the status quo ante, as it existed before H.B. 194 and H.B. 224.42 That would 
leave Ohio counties with the discretion to decide whether to make early voting 
available, provided that whatever early voting counties offered was open to all 
voters to the same extent that it was available to the military. However, the 
secretary of state, assuredly because he had already shown his commitment to 
uniform early voting schedules around the state, then set uniform statewide 
hours for early in-person voting on the final three days for all voters.43  
IV. IMPACT ON OTHER MILITARY VOTING ACCOMMODATIONS 
The Sixth Circuit’s affirmance of the preliminary injunction essentially 
settled the impact of Obama for America on the November 2012 election.44 
Because of the injunction, Ohio provided early in-person voting to all Ohio 
voters on the final Saturday, Sunday, and Monday of the 2012 election. But as 
of this writing, the issue of whether to grant permanent injunctive relief against 
enforcing H.B. 224 remains pending before the district court. Questions about 
                                                                                                                       
 38 Id. at *9. 
 39 Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 434. 
 40 Obama for Am., 2012 WL 3765060, at *11. 
 41 Directive No. 2012-35 from John Husted, Ohio Sec’y of State, to All Cnty. Bds. of 
Election 1 (Aug. 15, 2012), available at http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/Upload/ 
elections/directives/2012/Dir2012-35.pdf; see also Obama for Am., 2012 WL 3765060, at 
*3. 
 42 Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 437. 
 43 See Directive No. 2012-50 from John Husted, Ohio Sec’y of State, to All Cnty. Bds. 
of Election (Oct. 16, 2012), available at http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/Upload/elections/ 
directives/2012/Dir2012-50.pdf.  
 44 The Supreme Court denied an application for a stay of the preliminary injunction on 
Oct. 16, 2012. Husted v. Obama for Am., 133 S. Ct. 497 (2012).  
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the extent to which the equal protection claim might jeopardize other areas of 
military voting are sure to be part of the argument before the court.  
Of course, if the defendants ultimately convince the court that Ohio’s 
distinction in early in-person voting opportunities for military and non-military 
personnel does not violate the Equal Protection Clause, then the August 2012 
grant of the preliminary injunction will become a complete non-event for 
purposes of any precedential impact on other military voting accommodations. 
Indeed, substantial arguments remain that Ohio should have been able to limit 
the final three days of early voting only to military voters. But the discussion 
below argues that even if the plaintiffs ultimately do succeed on the merits of 
their equal protection claim—as the courts at the preliminary injunction stage 
have already said is “likely”—that result will do little to alter the long-settled 
principle that state legislatures and Congress generally may provide military 
voters a host of special accommodations without violating the Equal Protection 
Clause.45 Neither the various accommodations already provided to military 
voters, nor future new accommodations, seem seriously at risk. 
In part, this is because the courts themselves are so clearly committed to 
preserving accommodations for military voters. For instance, in granting the 
preliminary injunction, both the district court and the circuit court were careful 
to note that the injunction would in no way reduce the voting opportunities 
available to Ohio military voters in the 2012 election.46 Furthermore, both 
courts were at pains to explain their equal protection analysis in terms that 
would continue to sustain typical military voting accommodations, because of 
both the substantial state justifications for these accommodations and the minor 
burdens they imposed on other voters, as balanced under the Anderson–Burdick 
test.47 Albeit in dicta, the courts accordingly expressed continuing support for 
the full range of accommodations for military and overseas voters enacted in 
statutes such as the UOCAVA, the MOVE Act, and various state statutes.48 
In addition to the courts’ desire to protect military voting accommodations, 
these accommodations also likely remain safe because most of them can be 
easily justified under existing doctrine. As the Sixth Circuit noted, typical 
                                                                                                                       
 45 See Romeu v. Cohen, 265 F.3d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 2001); see also McDonald v. Bd. of 
Election Comm’rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809–11 (1969) (holding generally that limiting absentee 
voting provisions only to certain classes of voters does not violate Equal Protection Clause). 
 46 See Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 434–35; Obama for Am., 2012 WL 3765060, at *10. 
Of course, another concern is that requiring the state to allow all voters to participate equally 
in a voting opportunity initially granted only to military voters could lead a state to entirely 
eliminate that opportunity, whether as a cost-saving or burden-reducing measure, or as a 
partisan calculation, to the detriment of the military voters who would have benefitted if the 
state could offer the opportunity only to them. The courts were sensitive to this, and 
reasonably concluded that Ohio’s decision here was not truly driven by either cost or burden. 
See id. at 435–36. 
 47 See Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 434–35; Obama for Am., 2012 WL 3765060, at *8–
10. 
 48 See Obama for Am, 697 F.3d at 434–35; Obama for Am., 2012 WL 3765060, at *9–
10. 
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military voting accommodations “are based on highly relevant distinctions 
between [military voters] and the civilian population, and they confer benefits 
accordingly.”49 Implicit in this comment was a sense that the distinction 
between military and non-military voters was less relevant with respect to early 
in-person voting. Indeed, the circuit court noted that the problems facing 
military voters overwhelmingly involve mail delays and communication 
difficulties, problems that additional in-person voting opportunities do not 
remedy, in contrast with the bulk of military voting accommodations.50 
An intriguing dimension of this distinction is that the accommodations most 
responsive to the typical voting obstacles facing military voters involve the 
absentee voting process, while the accommodation at issue in the Obama for 
America case involved in-person voting. As Richard Pildes has suggested, in-
person early voting is perhaps best understood as an expansion of Election Day 
voting, not as a type of absentee voting.51 Arguably, in the same way that 
differential opportunities to access the polls on Election Day would trench upon 
the fundamental right to vote, differential opportunities for early in-person 
voting raise greater constitutional issues than do measures for no-excuse 
absentee voting, for which there is no fundamental constitutional right.52 The 
plaintiffs in the Obama for America case themselves had argued that the many 
equal protection precedents upholding variations in absentee voting options 
available to different kinds of voters were inapplicable, in that none of them 
“directly restricted access to the ballot box.”53  
Yet even if a distinction between early in-person voting and absentee voting 
ultimately proves chimerical as a matter of legal doctrine, it remains true that 
the difference in relative need for early in-person voting between military and 
non-military voters was much smaller than the differences in need for other 
voting accommodations. In its complaint, Obama for America had claimed that 
in fact there was no relevant difference, because military and non-military 
voters were “identically situated” with respect to early in-person voting.54 The 
defendants were quick to counter that military voters were not identically 
situated, because of the prospect of a sudden deployment right before Election 
Day. But the courts saw this difficulty as not nearly as different, either in 
                                                                                                                       
 49 Obama for Am, 697 F.3d at 434. 
 50 See id. 
 51 Richard Pildes, Early Voting and Constitutional Law, ELECTION LAW BLOG (Nov. 
27, 2012, 4:25 PM), http://electionlawblog.org/?author=7. 
 52 See McDonald v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807–08 (1969). 
 53 See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for a 
Preliminary Injunction and in Opposition to Intervenors’ Motion to Dismiss at 8, Obama for 
Am. v. Husted, No. 2:12-CV-0636, 2012 WL 3765060 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 31, 2012), available 
at 
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/documents/PlaintiffsMemorandumofLawinFu
rtherSupportofPlaintiffsMotionforaPreliminaryInjunction.pdf. 
 54 Complaint at 3, Obama for Am. v. Husted, No. 2:12-CV-0636, 2012 WL 3765060 
(S.D. Ohio Aug. 31, 2012), available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/litigation/ 
documents/ObamaforAmericavHustedcomplaint.pdf. 
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quality or degree, from comparable difficulties non-military voters also may 
face when required, whether for work or personal reasons, to travel away from 
home at the last minute just before Election Day. 
To be sure, non-military voters whose voting opportunities may be 
burdened by abrupt travel requirements are not risking their lives to defend their 
country under an organization in which the government exercises tight control 
over their personal affairs.55 But Ohio had not even guaranteed that its early 
voting scheme would solve this problem for military voters. The courts also 
concluded that if Ohio did provide early voting for some voters, it could provide 
it for all voters without a substantial additional state burden. 
Indeed, in assessing the comparative value of early in-person voting to 
different categories of voters, it is worth reflecting for a moment whether the 
prototypical military voter would even be able to take advantage of early in-
person voting. The UOCAVA and most state laws have defined the type of 
military voter to whom their protections apply as a voter who is “absent” from 
the voter’s place of voting residence.56 At the least, difficult interpretive 
questions therefore would arise about whether a military voter seeking to vote 
in-person is even covered by these statutes. The UMOVA, in contrast, redefined 
military voters to include all active duty military personnel, whether or not 
“absent” from their home precincts, precisely to provide a means of 
accommodating abrupt military deployments.57 Ohio, in a separate portion of 
H.B. 224, enacted selected parts of UMOVA, including this broader category of 
covered military voters.58 Under this broadened definition, any military voter is 
proactively able to use the military voting process, allowing the voter to register 
and apply for an absentee ballot simultaneously, to receive the ballot 
electronically at least forty-five days before Election Day, and even to use a 
Federal Write-in Absentee Ballot (FWAB) as a simultaneous absentee ballot 
application and absentee ballot, provided the FWAB reaches the appropriate 
election officials by the state absentee ballot application deadline.59 
                                                                                                                       
 55 Of course, these other burdened voters could be first responders—fire fighters, Red 
Cross employees, etc.—dispatched to respond to an unfolding crisis. 
 56 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff-6(1)(C) (Supp. IV 2011). 
 57 UNIFORM MILITARY AND OVERSEAS VOTERS ACT § 2(9) (2010), available at 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/military%20and%20overseas%20voters/umova_fi
nal_10.pdf. 
 58 See Amended Substitute H.B. 224, 129th Gen. Assemb., sec. 1, § 3511.01(C) (Ohio 
2012), available at http://www.legislature.state.oh.us/BillText129/129_HB_224_EN_ 
N.html. 
 59 In Ohio, that deadline is noon on the Saturday before Election Day. See OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 3511.02 (West Supp. 2012). Therefore, to take advantage of this 
accommodation a voter still might need to use it before knowing of an abrupt last-minute 
deployment. In that regard, early in-person voting through the Sunday and Monday before 
Election Day would still provide an additional option. 
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Finally, as others have observed, the Obama for America equal protection 
claim was highly fact dependent, at least at the preliminary injunction stage.60 
Its unique features include: the fact that Ohio was attempting to reduce the 
previously available period of early voting, giving rise to what some have 
termed a “non-retrogression” principle in equal protection analysis;61 
defendants’ evidentiary failure(s) to contest plaintiffs’ asserted burden on non-
military voters, or to establish the burden on county election officials of offering 
early voting to all voters on the three days before Election Day; and the 
convoluted evolution of the statutory scheme, which could lead to the view that 
the defendants’ claimed justifications were post-hoc efforts to rationalize an 
accidental enactment of an arbitrary advantage. In this factual context, the 
federal courts concluded that the defendants failed to establish a sufficient basis 
not to allow other voters also to take advantage of the same early in-person 
voting opportunities Ohio was providing to military voters. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Even if the precise conceptual theory by which the federal courts deem 
Ohio’s early in-person voting process to violate the Equal Protection Clause 
remains in some ways under-theorized, the judicial desire to sustain typical 
military voting accommodations remains strong. It thus seems likely that, in 
whatever way the conceptual theory advances, it will continue to protect the 
viability of these valuable accommodations for military voters. Obama for 
America therefore will provide little precedential basis for undoing the range of 
significant improvements that Congress and state legislatures have developed 
for military (and overseas) voters over many decades. 
                                                                                                                       
 60 See, e.g., Michael S. Kang, Michael Kang Responds to Foley on Obama for America 
Non-Retrogression Principle, ELECTION LAW @ MORITZ (Sept. 7, 2012), 
http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/comments/index.php?ID=9689. 
 61 See Richard L. Hasen, The 2012 Voting Wars, Judicial Backstops, and the 
Resurrection of Bush v. Gore 13 (U.C. Irvine Sch. of Law, Paper No. 2012-75), available at 
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